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This thesis proposes a solution to the problem of resilient state estimation and sensor fusion 
in an autonomous micro air vehicle. The setup comprises of redundant sensors that measure 
the same physical signal. An adversary may spoof a subset of these sensors and send 
falsified readings to the controller, potentially compromising performance and safety of 
the system. This work integrates Brooks-Iyengar Sensor fusion algorithm with a generic 
state estimator as a method to thwart sensor attacks. The algorithm outputs a point estimate 
and a fusion interval based on an assumed set of faulty sensors. Finally, the thesis illustrates 
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Cybersecurity incidents have been on the rise over the past years.  No industry, gadget, or 
tool is safe from threat and menace of cyber-attacks. The next generation of cyber physical 
systems (CPS) is becoming complex in design and encompass a diverse set of components 
and elements. Security concerns and considerations can no longer be an after-thought. The 
design process needs to incorporate these vectors and ensure necessary protection.  
Modern vehicles have numerous embedded elements communicating internally as 
well as externally using different technologies. Moreover, with the recent interest in 
Internet of Things (IOT), vehicle system designs have moved from insulated control 
systems to open and connected architectures with functionalities such as remote diagnostic 
information, inter-device communication, and online updates. An ever-increasing set of 
functionalities, network connectivity, and design complexity introduces security 
susceptibilities that are exploitable. Often the security guarantees of these systems are 
based on the security of external communication links and authentication protocols. 
Consequently, an effective attack that compromises the gateway, or physical attacks on 
components connected on the internal network may be leveraged to completely handicap 
the system. A similar strategy was used in [1] by the authors to disrupt the operation of a 
car and take complete control over it.  
An attack on a CPS may be carried out by intruding the computational nodes or 
communication channels and altering the physical environment. Information security 





physical environment may still be possible [2], [3] and [4]. In [2], [3] and [4] the authors 
review how an attack signal may be introduced into the control system loop by altering the 
sensor measurements. Orthodox cybersecurity techniques such as secure communication 
protocols for internal networks cannot defend the system against attacks on physical 
components. Acquiring access to the internal network would allow the attacker to 
completely compromise the controller, actuator, and all elements on board. Such attacks 
may be restricted by using cryptography tools. However, these tools may add additional 
processing delay and require additional resources, which might be scarce in some CPS 
domains. Researchers in [5] identified that it is necessary to address this security challenge 
in the control design phase because attacks may be disguised as malicious signals to the 
controller. Vaguely attacks may be classified into: 
• The attacker takes over a sensor to provide wrong readings. 
• Disturb actuation. 
The thesis primarily discusses the scenario when an adversary attacks the sensor 
measurements of a micro air vehicle (MAV) (a subclass of UAVs, see Table 1). Unmanned 
Air Vehicles (UAVs) are vehicles that are either controlled remotely by a Ground Control 
Station, radio remote controller, or autonomously programmed prior to the mission flight. 
UAVs are used for military missions as well as for commercial usage. MAVs hold the 
promise of enabling online retail, survey, emergency services, etc. They have been gaining 
recognition over the previous few years. With companies such as Amazon Prime [6], UPS, 
Google [7], DJI, GoPro investing heavily in these air vehicles, MAVs are gradually 





such MAVs making it more accessible to hobbyists and enthusiasts. One can construct a 
MAV in as less as $250 by procuring parts from multiple online vendors.  
Numerous companies working on different applications for such MAVs including 
and not limited to cinematography, rescue missions, agricultural chemical deployment, 
ecological surveys, emergency response, 3-D Mapping, drone delivery, etc. is increasing 
incessantly. However, their exposure to cyber-attacks makes them a potential tool for 
espionage, terrorism, vandalism, etc.  
Recently, commercial UAVs were authorized to fly in the US national air space by 
the FAA [8]. It is anticipated that more than 7 million small drones will occupy the US 
airspace by 2020 [9]. Consequently, the enticement for cyber-attacks on UAVs is only 
going to surge.  
With an increasing level of autonomy, the mandate for secure and hardened systems 
is going to surge exponentially. Additional studies and analysis, studying the susceptibility 
of MAVs to cyber-attacks and investment in security of MAVs at each layer of abstraction 
is quintessential. The infamous attack on a UAV system [10] highlighted this need; when 
members of a terrorist group intercepted and recorded a UAV video feed using a $26 
software SkyGrabber. SkyGrabber was designed to capture free satellite-entertainment 
channels [10]. Investigations revealed that this was enabled due to an unencrypted video 
channel. It was revealed later [11], that the flaw was known to the US government since 
the 1990s. In 2012, Iranian forces stated that they captured an RQ-170 [12], [13]. 
Subsequently they landed the UAV and obtained mission data. It was postulated that a lack 
of security measures of the UAV sensor system was used to attack the GPS subsystem [12]. 





hijack a military UAV by spoofing the GPS signal and thereby taking complete control of 
the UAV. They showcased a proof-of-concept by using $1,000 worth of equipment. These 
above cases demonstrate a necessity for investment in research for cybersecurity for UAVs 
of all classes for military and public use.  
Moreover, the GPS-spoofing notion emphasizes the need to include unusual 
elements (e.g. sensors, input channels) while developing risk assessment models of UAVs 
and for other autonomous systems. Autonomous systems such as UAVs, Unmanned 
Ground Vehicles (UGVs), etc. are dependent on their sensor systems to operate optimally. 
Ensuring that all the logical ports are hardened is vital to building a secure system.  
The motivation for this work surfaced from our shared conviction that there is an 
increasing threat diversity of attack threats to UAVs. A UAV that can fly at high speeds 
over people and property is a weapon. Just like hacking is prevalent online, a UAV is 
susceptible to the same risks with far greater consequences.  
It has been established by investigations that cheap consumer MAVs are not secure. 
As presented by Rodday (2015) [15], even professional grade MAVs previously presumed 
to be secure and hack-proof; used by government agencies, have been found to be 
susceptible to naïve attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks. The security of such 
professional grade MAVs is crucial because of the sensitivity of their missions. Hijacking 
such drones may lead to loss of property and mission failure amongst other effects.  
Due to the lack of adequate depth in cybersecurity of UAVs till recent past, most 
of the existing autopilot software and their underlying control architecture, state estimation 
techniques were built without taking security constraints into account. Since UAVs rely 





to develop autopilot systems that are robust and secure against adversaries. We hope that 
our work through this thesis has a contribution towards this goal.  
Quadcopters were identified as the system of interest because of their simplicity. 
The platform is easy to implement for testing. There are only four control variables, which 
enable 3 degrees of freedom. Furthermore, there are growing applications of quadrotors 
and other such MAVs in varied industries. 
This work examines the problem of resilient state estimation in MAV against sensor 
spoofing. Resilient state estimation is the study of estimating the system states when sensor 
measurements are compromised by attackers. It overviews the problem of attack resilient 
state estimation in autonomous systems where multiple sensors measure the same physical 
signal. In the scenario, where a malicious attacker may corrupt a subset of these sensors, 
falsified sensor measurements are passed to the controller, potentially compromising the 
safety of the system. The range of sensor attacks is evaluated in section 2.3.2.4. 
1.1. Research Goals 
This following research goals were identified at the beginning of the thesis.  
RG-1. Identify security vulnerabilities that exist in the system design of MAVs. 
RG-2. Review the state estimator used in our system of interest. Study the impact 
of sensor attacks on the state estimation algorithm. Identify the most critical sensor 
to the state estimation process. 
RG-3. Identify a resilient sensor fusion technique to improve the state estimation 
process. Integrate resilient sensor fusion technique with the generic state estimator. 
RG-4. Verify improvement in resilience to sensor spoofing attacks with the 





1.2. Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. In chapter 1 the need for a study for cybersecurity 
consideration for MAVs is introduced, it identifies the need for the investigation and the 
research goals. Chapter 2 summarizes the numerous security vulnerabilities and threat 
vectors that exist in the current MAV models available to the public sector. Following 
which, a synopsis of the state estimation techniques used in the system of interest is covered 
in chapter 3. This background on state estimation is important to understand the critical 
sensors in a MAV since it highlights the impact of sensor attacks on the system. Chapter 4 
outlines Brooks-Iyengar Fusion as a resilient sensor fusion technique to defend against 
sensor fusion attacks. The thesis proposes integrating Brooks-Iyengar Fusion with a 
generic state estimator. In Chapter 5, the performance of the proposed state estimator is 
showcased through results of a software in the loop simulations in the presence of sensor 
spoofing attacks. The improvement in the state estimation process with the proposed state 
estimator is evident. In chapter 6, the thesis is concluded with a summary of research goals 
covered and a direction of future research. Figure 1, describes how the scope of this 
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2. Vulnerability Analysis of Unmanned 
Air Vehicles 
In this chapter, our system of interest is described and the different kind of threat vectors 
to a MAV are reviewed. Following which a case highlighting the need for securing against 
sensor attacks in a MAV is presented and the security problem that this thesis aims to tackle 
is identified. As defined by the Department of Defense [16] : 
“A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses 
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, 
can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic 
or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered 
unmanned aerial vehicles.” 
The primary difference between a UAV and normal air vehicle is that no crew is 
required to be on board the vehicle. The vehicle may be remotely controlled or programmed 
for autonomous operation under supervision.  
2.1. Types of UAVs 
The following classification of UAVs is based on Austin [17] . Austin classifies the UAVs 
based on the size and capability of the air vehicle to carry out a given mission. However, 
there may be scenarios where a user or a system employs the air vehicle for different types 
of missions. The focus of this work is primarily resilient state estimation problem for 







HALE (High altitude long 
endurance) 
These are operated by Air Forces from fixed bases. They can 
fly at high altitudes of 15,000m and can operate for more 
than 24 hours. They are generally armed and are used for 
long range (trans global) reconnaissance and surveillance.  
MALE (Medium altitude 
long endurance) 
They operate at comparatively shorter ranges (greater than 
500 km). They can fly at altitudes of 5,000m to 1,500m, but 
from fixed bases. 
TUAV (Tactical UAV) 
These vehicles are smaller and have simpler than HALE and 
MALE. They are operated by land and naval forces and have 
a range of up to 500km.  
Close-Range UAVs 
They operate at ranges of 100 km and are used in fields, 
including roles such as reconnaissance, target designation, 
NBC monitoring ship-to-shore surveillance, airfield security, 
power-line inspection, crop-spraying, etc. 
MUAV or Mini UAV 
These UAV's of below a specific mass generally below 20 
kg. They operate at a range of about30 km. They are 
primarily used by mobile battle groups and for numerous 
civilian purposes. 
Micro UAV or MAV 
The MAVs were initially described as a UAV having a 
wing-span of 150 mm or less. This condition has been 
relaxed now. They are mostly used for urban operations and 
for commercial purposes. 
 Table 1: Classification of UAVs. Austin [17]  
2.2. System of Interest: 
The system of interest is a quadrotor that uses a Pixhawk flight controller. The flight 





control as indicated in Figure 3. The MAV may be set for autonomous navigation using an 
on-board computer.  
Pixhawk is an open-hardware project that was conceptualized and developed in 
consequence to the PIXHAWK Project at the Autonomous Systems Lab at ETH Zurich. It 
was primarily made to provide sophisticated autopilot hardware and software to academic, 
hobby, and industrial communities at low costs. This platform was identified based on its 
outreach, capabilities, and its market share. It is an industry standard and designed by the 
team in conjunction with 3D Robotics and the ArduPilot Group. The technical 
specifications as specified are [18]: 
§ 168 MHz Cortex M4F CPU (256 KB RAM, 2 MB Flash) 
§ Sensors: 3D Accelerometer / Gyroscope / Magnetometer / Barometer 
§ Integrated backup, override and failsafe processor with mixing 
§ microSD card slot, 5 UARTs, CAN, I2C, SPI, ADC, etc. 
The main components in our system as indicated in Figure 1 include: 
1. PIXHAWK Flight Controller 
2. GPS/3DOF Measurement Sensor 
3. RC Receiver 
4. Ground Control Station 
5. Radio Controller 








Figure 2: Different components in our system of interest. 
 





2.3. Threat Analysis: 
The type of attacks that may be mounted on a given MAV being operated autonomously, 
or being controlled by the operator is overviewed in this section. The intentions of the 
attacker may be unknown. As discussed in [19], vulnerabilities can be classified broadly 
into application logic attacks where the attacker manipulates the sensor readings and other 
inputs into the control system and control system attacks that damage the normal behavior 
of the control system. 
 
Figure 4: Threats to a UAV 
2.3.1. Physical Attacks 
Physical attacks could include physically targeting the MAV with a tool or a weapon. It 
could be a missile launcher or a gun targeting the MAV. However, the cost for mounting 
such an attack would far outweigh the incentive. Other attacks include flying another drone 
into the target drone. One may also use other tools such as high-powered magnetic beams 
to damage the electronic circuits on the drone. One may throw a net on the MAV to stop 





2.3.2. Logical Attacks 
A brief description of the system structure and the exchange of control signals is described 
in Figure 4. There are multiple control channels and several technologies enabling these 
channels to control flight parameters such as position, pose, altitude, waypoints, etc. Since 
these MAVs are autonomous and are generally not controlled actively, a compromised 
channel may severely damage the mission goals. If an attacker changes high level control 
signals such as way points or even change parameters such as calibration parameters of the 
sensors, MAV may be lost or damaged. Total control of the MAV may be lost without any 
scope of recovery if system parameters are changed or a malware software is installed on 
board.  
The control channels may use different technologies such as 4G LTE, Radio, XBee, 
etc. Many of the low cost and low power control channel technologies do not have secure 
protocols and are susceptible to cyber-attacks. Consequently, a lot of MAV manufacturers 
are limited from installing security protocols and authentication modules because of the 
limited processing capabilities. Also, using regular encryption and authentication 
techniques adds delay corresponding to encryption and initial key exchange. 
In [20], Villasenor points out the growing concern of counterfeit electronics. He 
argues that the electronics supply chain could be intentionally compromised during design. 
If these vulnerabilities are placed into the design prior to manufacture with sufficient skill, 
they would be extremely difficult to detect. These backdoors could be exploited years later 





2.3.2.1. Control Channel Attacks 
As observed in Figure 5, there are multiple control signals that may be used to send forged 
data to the MAV. This is possible because of the absence of application layer encryption 
in the MAV - GCS communication channel or the lack of authentication protocols. Without 
a method to verify if the data received through the communication channel is legitimate or 
not, the flight controller ought to assume that the data received is correct. This permits 
forged signals to be processed as any other correct signals from an authorized operator. 
This is a critical flaw that may be used to mount attacks such as changing the mission plan, 
changing way points, etc. and may lead to loss of control of the MAV permanently. 
Sometimes proprietary protocols are used without proper encryption and authentication 
techniques. Even though these techniques may provide some level of security, these 
protocols can be reverse engineered or an attacker might just mount a replay attack leading 
to unexpected behavior. 
 





2.3.2.2. Denial of Service Attacks (DoS): 
An attacker may use a simple Denial of Service attack on any of the control channels which 
use wireless communication. Anyone close to either the transmitter or the receiver can 
receive signals and analyze the packet information, making it vulnerable. Both the receiver 
and the transmitter use the same channel for communication; the adversary may flood this 
channel with bogus signals and thereby prevent legitimate messages and signals from being 
sent and received. A hobby MAV, the AR.Drone operated using smartphones through a 
local WIFI network was de-authenticated using such DoS attacks [21] . 
2.3.2.3. Replay Attacks 
As suggested in section 2.3.2.2, in case of proprietary protocols used as security measures, 
one may use replay attacks to disrupt the normal operation of a MAV. One may even use 
the same type of replay attacks even if the messages were encrypted. This would include 
recording the signals and replaying them at a later period. This attack is only feasible when 
there are no authentication modules to verify the origin of these messages. 
2.3.2.4. Sensor Attacks 
Sensor attacks can be mounted by installing malicious software on the flight controller or 
the processor responsible for processing the sensor information. The software modifies the 
sensor information before it is passed to the flight controller. The Stuxnet malware is a 
famous example of such an attack [22]. Often, MAVs may rely on networked infrastructure 
for sharing sensor information. This may be for swarm robotics, VICON systems, or WIFI 
localization systems. An attacker may degrade sensor measurements by manipulating the 
data packets being exchanged between different modules, elements or subsystems of the 





or modifying the sensor environment. This may lead the sensor to pass false information 
of the value of physical signal it attempts to measure.  
An attempt to externally manipulate the sensor measurements in a MAV was 
described in [23]. In [23], Son et al. presented their work on “Rocking Drones with 
Intentional Sound Noise on Gyroscopic Sensors”. They described a method using 
consumer grade electronics to introduce noise in gyroscope sensor measurements. They 
exploited the fact that resonant frequencies of many MEMS based gyroscopes are found in 
the audible frequency band. They also present the effect of resonant/attacked output of the 
gyroscopes on the flight control of the drone. They describe the attacking technique and 
establish the consequence of such attacks, refer to Figures 6 and 7. In figure 6 and figure 
7, region A and region C correspond to the gyroscope operating under normal conditions, 
whereas region B corresponds to the region where the gyroscope is under attack (Fig 6.a.). 
The operator increases the throttle of the quadrotor to increase its altitude (Fig 6.b.); as 
soon as the attack starts, the altitude drops and the quadrotor crashes (Fig 7.b.). 
 
 






Figure 7: a) Rotor Control Data. b) Altitude of the System [23]  
2.3.2.4.1. Global Positioning System (GPS) 
DoS attacks like the one mentioned in section 2.3.2.2 can be mounted on GPS modules by 
flooding garbage signals on the target GPS frequencies. This prevents correct signals from 
passing through and disrupts localization and state estimation. There are devices available 
that enable such jamming with different levels of sophistication. GPS jamming could be 
used to disrupt the mission by preventing the MAV to reach its destination.  
GPS spoofing is also another plausible threat vector. One may spoof GPS signals 
and introduce them to the channel. The under-attack MAV may use the forged signals in 
its state estimation calculations. Accordingly, an attacker may convince the MAV to 
redirect its path because of a falsely identified location. 
2.3.2.5. Software Attacks 
There are two components to the software: the software on the ground control station and 
the on-board software for flight control for conducting the autonomous mission. The 





Prior to the mission (or during the mission) the GCS programs the MAV with the mission 
data including waypoints and other mission information. In most configurations, the GCS 
is connected to the flight computer or flight controller constantly through a wireless 
channel. The attacker may use malware onto the flight controller or on the ground control 
station. This would allow the attacker to reprogram the flight mission and control the flight 
as suited. The following scenarios are possible: 
• The ground control station is connected to the Internet and the attacker uses the 
flight planner in real time to obtain live control of the MAV. 
• The attacker may introduce malware on the ground control station, which may 
preprogram the flight as per the intentions of the attacker.  
• A lot of hobby drones use generic ground control station software with an unsecure 
communication link. One might use this vulnerability to force pair their computer 



























In this chapter, the threat vectors for a MAV were identified. The threat vectors can be 
broadly classified into physical attacks and logical attacks. Logical attacks were further 
classified into control channel attacks, denial of service attacks, replay attacks, man in the 
middle attacks, sensor attacks, and software attacks. Most of the logical attacks are 
application layer security problems and must be tackled using encryption, authentication 
and other application logic security techniques. However, sensor attacks, actuator attacks 
and controller attacks are control system security problems. The work of Son et al. [23] is 
presented to highlight the impact of sensor attacks on a MAV. The fact that the MAV 
crashes as soon as there is an attack on it is an important observation. This highlights the 
importance of studying the problem of resilient state estimation. The work in this thesis 
discusses the problem of defending against sensor attacks for MAVs. Next, in Chapter 3, 
the state estimation process in a current state of the art flight controller is reviewed to 






3. Background on State Estimation in 
MAVs 
This chapter discusses the state estimation technique and a modular approach to state 
estimation implemented in a flight controller. A controller in a MAV relies heavily on 
information on the current state of the system. The controllers need information on the 
states (position, attitude) at a high rate with minimum delay because of the fast dynamics 
of the system. Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) form the core of the state estimation 
algorithm. IMUs consist of a gyroscope to measure angular velocity and an accelerometer 
to measure the linear acceleration. Most MAVs can carry an IMU because of its 
lightweight, inexpensiveness, and low energy requirements. In addition to noisy sensor 
readings, the sensors are affected by a continuous time-varying bias; thereby making a 
continuous accurate estimation of the pose in aggressive flights difficult and error prone. 
Hence, IMUs are used in conjunction with other sensors such as cameras, Sound 
Navigation and Ranging (SONAR), Light Radar (LIDAR), Global Positioning System 
(GPS), etc. to support an accurate estimate.  
IMUs have a high update frequency but with drifting measurements leading to error 
accumulation. Sensors such as cameras, GPS, and laser systems have slowly drifting 
measurements but at a much slower update rate. As suggested by Weiss (2012) [24], 
sensors can be classified based on their drift speed and frame rate as in Figure 1. IMUs 
have a high update rate but with accumulating errors, whereas GPS and Laser Trackers 





lie at the top left corner of the graph in Figure 7. Consequently, it’s necessary to have 
sensors in addition to the IMU to enable good state estimation. The analysis in this chapter 
is based on the work of Weiss (2012) [24] and Achtelik (2013) [25]. The discussion 
analyzes a 6 Degree of Freedom (DOF) sensor (a camera) along with a 3DOF position 
sensor (GPS) in addition to the on-board IMU. The discussion follows an Extended Kalman 
Filter Framework to establish an algorithm to address the issue of drifting measurements 
and low update rates.  
 
Figure 9: Classification of sensors based on drift type and update rate [24]  
3.1. Extended Kalman Filter Framework  
The Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is useful in MAVs because it is recursive and does not 
need a history of state estimates to establish the current state estimate. It does so by 
minimizing the error of the observed estimates. Within a EKF, there is a prediction step 





the system and the uncertainty of the process (covariance propagation) using the model of 
the system. In the correction step, a sensor measurement is applied to the sensor model, 
which corrects the state of the system and is used to update the uncertainty of the estimate. 
The step is referred to as correction and covariance update.  
Section 3.1.1 explores the EKF framework for an MAV as described in [24] and [25]. This 
chapter aims to identify the most critical sensor with respect to state estimation process.   
3.1.1. MAV Process Model vs Direct IMU Input 
There are two techniques/models for state prediction.  
MAV Model IMU Model 
When, a MAV Model is used for the 
prediction process. It uses the torques 
and thrusts originating from the rotors 
as inputs to the process Model. 
IMU measurements use linear 
acceleration and angular velocity as 
inputs to the process model. Acceleration 
is integrated to calculate velocity, which 
is integrated to calculate the position. 
Table 2: Comparing the MAV and IMU model 
The IMU measurement model is advantageous because of lower computational 
requirements. This is better exemplified when one analyzes the state size and weighs the 
cost of IMU updates in the range of 1kHz.  The following comparison is expressed in [24]. 
1. State Size: For the MAV model, the input to the process model will consist of angular 
momentum. This process model will require additional vector states. Update and 
covariance predictions steps run at high frequencies and require dense matrix 





2. Measurement update: As discussed in section 3.1.1, MAV process model has angular 
momentum from rotor speeds as its inputs. IMU readings are used for EKF 
measurement updates. Consequently, EKF updates must be computed for each IMU 
measurement. At high measurement rates tending to 1kHz it gets computationally 
expensive. However, when one use an IMU based model, IMU measurements appear 
only in the EKF prediction step, which needs only a few calculations despite the 
frequency. There are also benefits when analyzing the computational complexity. 
3. Model uncertainty: The system model may not be accurate for all platforms. The MAV 
model is not constant and may change based on different payloads and different 
positioning of payloads. The moment of inertia, mass, rotor constants may change 
based on the platform used. These model parameters can be estimated using our EKF 
framework at a cost of a few additional states, again adding to computational 
complexity. However, in the case of IMU based models, one must measure the current 
linear acceleration and angular velocity to evaluate the position and orientation.  
4. Un-modeled disturbances: There may be un-modeled disturbances such as wind gusts. 
The IMU model is advantageous because it rejects noisy IMU measurements. IMUs 
measure disturbances accurately but take a few time updates and corrections before the 
MAV realizes it was a real disturbance. Modeling such disturbances for the MAV 
model is a difficult task. Researchers have tried to model wind speeds and wind gusts. 
Modeling wind gusts requires many assumptions and is a complex analysis. One would 
have to incorporate these disturbances in his MAV model and for accurate state 
estimation. However, in the case of an IMU model, disturbances are measured directly 





3.1.2. Mathematical Background – Quaternion Algebra 
This section is based on the work done by Trawny and Roumeliotis (2015) [26]. Below is 
a brief discussion on quaternion algebra. 
Any quaternion 𝑞 is defined as: 
𝑞 = 𝑞# + 𝑞%𝑖 + 𝑞'𝑗 + 𝑞)𝑘 
where 𝑞# is the real part and 𝑞%𝑖 + 𝑞'𝑗 + 𝑞)𝑘 is the imaginary part. Here  𝑞%, 𝑞', 𝑞) are real 
numbers, and 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 are hyperimaginary numbers.   The quaternion can also be written as a 
4-dimenstional-column matrix: 
𝑞 = [𝑞%		𝑞'		𝑞)		𝑞#]/ 
Let 𝑞  and 𝑝 be two quaternions, then quaternion multiplication can be defined as: 
𝑞⨂𝑝 = (𝑞# + 𝑞%𝑖 + 𝑞'𝑗 + 𝑞)𝑘)(𝑝# + 𝑝%𝑖 + 𝑝'𝑗 + 𝑝)𝑘)	
𝑞⨂𝑝 = 𝑞 −𝑞
/
𝑞 𝑞𝐼) + 𝑞×
. 𝑝 = 𝑝 −𝑝
/
𝑝 𝑝𝐼) + 𝑝×
. 𝑞 






The cross product of two quaternions can also be written as:	𝑞×𝑝 = 𝑞× 𝑝  
3.2. Extended Kalman Filter Setup 
For the EKF setup, the IMU process model is used based on the discussion in section 3.1.1. 
The prediction and covariance propagation steps for the core states is discussed in the 
following sections. Other sensors may add additional or different states, however the 
formulation of the core set of states obtained from the IMU does not change, because IMU 





3.2.1. Inertial Sensor Model 
The IMU measurements are perturbed by a bias 𝑏 and additive white Gaussian noise 𝑛. 
Thus, the real angular velocity 𝜔 and the real linear acceleration 𝑎 in the IMU frame can 
be modeled as: 
𝜔 = 𝜔= − 𝑏> − 𝑛>	
𝑎 = 𝑎= − 𝑏? − 𝑛?	
𝐸 𝑛>/𝑛? = 0)×% 
where 𝜔 is the angular velocity, 𝑎 is the acceleration, subscript 𝑚 refers to the measured 
value, 𝑏 refers to the bias and 𝑛 is the additive white Gaussian noise. Here 𝐸 𝑛>/𝑛?  is the 
expectation of the noise signals 𝑛>, 𝑛?. Additive refers to noise that is added to any noise 
that may be intrinsic to the system. The bias dynamics is modeled as a random walk process 
with zero mean white Gaussian noise as its time derivative. Thus, we model the bias as: 
𝑏> = 𝑛CD 
𝑏? = 𝑛CE 
𝐸 𝑛CD = 0)×% 
𝐸 𝑛CE = 0)×% 
3.2.2. State Representation  







where 𝑝>H  is the position of the IMU in the world frame,	𝑣>	H 	 is the velocity of the IMU in 
the world frame,	𝑞>H 	is the quaternion describing rotation from the world frame to the IMU 





notations refer to the estimate of that variable, for example 𝑥G is the estimate of the core 
set of states for our state estimator. 
The equations that govern the abovementioned states are: 
𝑝>H = 𝑣>H 	








𝑏> = 𝑛CD	𝑏? = 𝑛CE 
Please note that g is the gravity vector, and 𝐶>H  is the rotation matrix computed 
using 𝑞>H .  It is essential to include the biases as states, since these drifts accumulate over 
time and must be updated online. Quaternions are used to represent the attitude of the 
MAV. 
Next, calculate the error vectors for each of the states. Note that, as suggested in 
[26], the error in the quaternion value is calculated as 𝛿𝑞, instead of the difference between 
𝑞	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑞  (the actual value of the quaternion and the quaternion estimate respectively). 
Hence, using the small angle approximation:  
𝑞 = 		 𝑞⨂𝛿𝑞 ⇔ 𝛿𝑞 = 𝑞∗⨂𝑞 
If the rotation corresponding with the error quaternion 𝛿𝑞 is very small, we can use the 
small angle approximation and calculate the error angle vector	𝛿𝜃 as: 
𝛿𝑞 = 𝛿𝑞𝛿𝑞#






where	𝛿𝜃 is the angle vector. Similarly, in the case of rotation matrices, as suggested in 
[25], 





Δ𝐶 ≈ 𝐼) + 𝛿𝜃×  
For other states, use the arithmetic difference to calculate the error, i.e., 𝑥 = 𝑥 − 𝑥. 




/		Δ𝑏>/ 		Δ𝑏?/  
∆𝑝>H = ∆𝑣>H  
∆𝑣>H = −𝐶>H . 𝑎= − 𝑏? × . 𝛿𝜃
H − 𝐶>H . Δ𝑏? − 𝐶>H 𝑛? 
𝛿𝜃>H = 𝜔= − 𝑏> × . 𝛿𝜃>
H − Δ𝑏> − 𝑛> 
∆𝑏> = 𝑛CD	 
∆𝑏? = 𝑛CE 
The above equations can be summarized as 𝑥G = 𝐹GG. 𝑥G + 𝐺GG. 𝑛 . Linearizing above 
equations using noise vector 𝑛G = 𝑛?/		𝑛CE
/ 		𝑛>/ 		𝑛CD
/  around 𝑥G . Here, the superscript c 







𝜕𝑛 𝑥G. 𝑛 = 𝐹G
G. 𝑥G + 𝐺GG. 𝑛 
Calculate the noise covariance matrix for the discrete case as described in [24]: 
𝑄G] = 𝐹G] 𝜏_` . 𝐺G
G. 𝑄GG. 𝐺G
G,/. 𝐹G] 𝜏 /𝑑 𝜏 , where 
 
𝐹G] =
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' ). The superscript 𝑐 in 𝐹GG refers to the continuous space, whereas 
the superscript 𝑑 in 𝑄G] refers to the discrete space, 𝐼]ais a 3x3 identity matrix. 
3.2.3. Propagation Steps: 
The propagation steps for the state variables is as follows: 
1. Using the state variable differential equations propagate the state variables. For the 
quaternion, use the quaternion integration method described in [26]: 
𝑞 𝑡st% = exp
1
2
Ω 𝜔 Δ𝑡 +
1
48
Ω 𝜔 𝑡st% Ω 𝜔 𝑡s − Ω 𝜔 𝑡st% Ω 𝜔 𝑡st% Δ𝑡' 𝑞 𝑡s  





3. State covariance matrix is calculated using 𝑃st% s = 𝐹]𝑃s s𝐹],/ + 𝑄]	[25]. 
3.2.4. Measurement Models: 
As noted earlier in the introduction of chapter 3, for robust state estimation, additional 
sensors are needed around the IMU. These sensors help in correcting drift from integration 
of IMU sensors. Note that the origin of the additional sensors does not coincide with that 
of the IMU. Hence, additional states must be added to the core state 𝑥G. These states include 
the displacement 𝑝H{  of the sensor from the IMU for the 6DOF and 3DOF sensors, the 
rotation 𝑞H{ of the sensor from the IMU frame, and a scaling factor 𝜆. Note that these states 
do not have any associated dynamics and are not updated during the propagation step: 
𝑝H{ = 0 
𝜆 = 0 
𝑞}{ = 0 
3.2.4.1. 6DOF Sensor: 
As mentioned in section 3.2.4, one needs additional states for a 6DOF sensor. The new 




𝑧 = 𝑝>{ = 𝑝H{ + 𝐶>H . 𝑝H{ . 𝜆 + 𝑛 
where 𝑧	 is the position measurement from the sensor and 𝑛  is the additive white 
Gaussian noise. The position error is defined as: 
𝑧 = 𝑧 − 𝑧 
𝑧 = 𝑝H{ + 𝐶>H . 𝑝H{ . 𝜆 + 𝑛 − 𝑝H{ + 𝐶>H . 𝑝H{ . 𝜆 





Also 𝑧 can be expressed using: 
𝑝 = ∆𝑝 + 𝑝 
𝐶 = 𝐶. (𝐼) + 𝑑𝜃× ) 
As indicated in [24], solving for 𝑧 using the above equations yields: 
𝑧 = Δ𝑝>H 𝜆+𝐶>H . Δ𝑝H{. 𝜆 − 𝐶>H 𝑝H{× . 𝛿𝜃. 𝜆 + 𝑝>H . Δλ + 𝐶>H . 𝑝H{. Δ𝜆 
The rotation measurement is  
𝑧e = 𝑞>{ ⨂𝑞{H⨂𝛿𝑞p 
Error rotation calculations are used to evaluate the following, like in [24]. 
𝑞 = 𝑞⨂𝛿𝑞 ⟺ 𝛿𝑞 = 𝑞∗⨂𝑞	𝑜𝑟	𝐶 = 𝐶. Δ𝐶 ⟺ Δ𝐶 = 𝐶/. 𝐶 
Rotation error is formulated as in [24]: 
Δ𝐶 = 𝐶/. 𝐶. Δ𝐶p 
Δ𝐶 = 𝐶H{
. 𝐶>H
. 𝐶>H . 𝐶H{. Δ𝐶p	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	Δ𝐶 = 𝐼) + 𝛿𝜃×  
𝛿𝜃× = 𝐼) + 𝐶H{
. 𝛿𝜃>H × . 𝐶H{ . 𝐼) + 𝛿𝜃H{× . 𝐼) + 𝛿𝜃p× − 𝐼) 
Higher order terms such as 𝛿𝜃×𝛿𝜃 are omitted. These terms only cause errors at the point 
of linearization where the expected value of these terms is zero. Also note that: 
C. 𝑥× . 𝐶/ = 𝐶. 𝑥×  
Hence following the discussion in [24], the estimation error can be calculated as: 
𝑑𝜃× ≈ 𝐶H{
. 𝑑𝜃>H × . 𝐶H{ +	 𝑑𝜃H{× +	 𝑑𝜃p× 	
⇒ 𝑧e = 𝛿𝜃 = 𝐶H{
. 𝑑𝜃>H + 	𝑑𝜃H{ + 𝛿𝜃p 
Thereafter, one can calculate the values for the Jacobians using the expressions obtained 

















note that 𝐻  is the observability matrix obtained by stacking 𝐻	and 𝐻e , 𝑃  is the state 
covariance matrix and 𝑉 is obtained by stacking 𝑉 and 𝑉e. 
Following which, proceed with the EKF correction steps as formulated in [24]: 
1. Calculate residual, i.e., the error in the estimate: 𝑧 = 𝑧/	𝑧e/
/
 
2. Calculate Innovation: 𝑆 = 𝐻. 𝑃. 𝐻/ + 𝑉. 𝑅. 𝑉  
3. Calculate Kalman Gain: 𝐾 = 𝑃.𝐻. 𝑆% 
4. Calculate correction: 𝑥 = 𝐾. 𝑧 
5. Correct the states using the following equations: 





b. 𝑥 = 𝑥 − 𝑥 for the remaining states 
6. State covariance is updated as:  
𝑃st% st% = 𝐼 + 𝐾.𝐻 . 𝑃st% s. 𝐼 + 𝐾.𝐻 / + 𝐾. 𝑉. 𝑅. 𝑉/. 𝐾/ 
3.2.4.2. 3DOF Sensor (GPS): 
In this section, we analyze inclusion of a 3DoF Sensor such as GPS or a laser tracker, which 
yields the position of the vehicle in the world frame. The rotation vector is irrelevant and 
is not included as the state 𝑞{H . Nonetheless, keep the scaling factor and the translational 
calibration state for the position vector from the IMU to the sensor as suggested in [25]. 




𝑧 = 𝑝>{ = 𝑝H{ + 𝐶>H . 𝑝H{ . 𝜆 + 𝑛 







𝜕𝑥 , 𝐻e =
𝜕𝑧e







Following which, proceed with the EKF correction steps as formulated in [24]:  
1. Calculate residual: 𝑧 = 𝑧/
/
 
2. Calculate Innovation: 𝑆 = 𝐻. 𝑃. 𝐻/ + 𝑉. 𝑅. 𝑉/ 
3. Calculate Kalman Gain: 𝐾 = 𝑃.𝐻. 𝑆% 
4. Calculate correction: 𝑥 = 𝐾. 𝑧 
5. Correct the states using the following equations: 





b. 𝑥 = 𝑥 − 𝑥 for the remaining states 
6. State covariance is updated as:  
𝑃st% st% = 𝐼 + 𝐾.𝐻 . 𝑃st% s. 𝐼 + 𝐾.𝐻 / + 𝐾. 𝑉. 𝑅. 𝑉/. 𝐾/ 
3.3. Vulnerability of the State Estimator 
In section 3.1 and section 3.2, a background on EKF based state estimator frame work was 
provided to highlight the importance of the IMU at the core of the state estimator. The IMU 
measurements form the core of the EKF framework and are explicitly used in the “Time 
Update – Prediction Step” and implicitly affect the calculations of the state covariance and 
noise covariance matrix. Hence any attack on the IMU compromises the state estimator. 
Figure 10 depicts the normal operation of the state estimator and Figure 11 illustrates the 






Figure 10: Extended Kalman Filter Framework 
 






This chapter presents a background on the essential components of state estimation in 
autonomous MAVs. Many essential aspects of state estimation, enabling autonomous 
flights with a MAV were covered. First, the different models used for the state estimation 
in MAVs were compared. The IMU model was identified as a better option for the state 
estimator. The IMU measurements received at rates of 1kHz were used for the prediction 
process of the state estimator and form an integral part of the state covariance matrix, noise 
covariance matrix calculations; hence, implicitly impacting the performance of the 
correction process of the state estimator as well. 
Thus, there is a necessity to secure the IMU from sensor attacks. The IMU 
measurements form the core of the state estimation process and must be safeguarded 
against any malicious intents. In the next chapter, a method of integrating a resilient sensor 
fusion technique while using redundant sensors to counteract the effect of attacks on the 
IMU is proposed. The background review on the state estimation process is vital to 






4. Resilient State Estimation for MAVs 
Most cyber-physical systems and specifically MAVs are systems that continuously interact 
with dynamic and stochastic environments. Sensors are fundamental to transforming 
physical signals into logical signals, thereby providing an irreplaceable bridge between the 
real world and control systems. Sensors are undeniably one of the most important parts of 
automated control systems like MAVs. In this chapter, the problem of state estimation in 
the presence of compromised sensors is confronted. 
4.1. Related Work 
This section examines the current state of the art in resilient state estimation and secure 
control techniques against faults, failures, and attacks. It is a result of an exhaustive search 
of recent publications on our topics of interest.  
First, the latest research on attack models and attack techniques on cyber physical 
systems and control systems is reviewed in this chapter. In [4], Teixeira et al.  present an 
adversarial model for networked control system architecture. Using a typical control 
architecture for a networked control system, they analyze and present attack models for 
replay attacks, bias injection attacks, and zero dynamics. This work is useful for modeling 
attack spaces and threat vectors. In [27], Smith discussed a method to covertly modify 
sensor and actuator signals. He suggested that it can be accomplished by intruding the 
network or through physically modifying the sensors. He also proposes a parametrized 
feedback structure to gain control of a Linear time-invariant plant. The controller assumes 
that any disturbance or fault entering the system is comparable to an uncompromised 





knowledge of the controller is not needed. The above work advocates the case for 
safeguarding the sensors and the state estimation process. 
There have been numerous investigations into various approaches to secure general 
cyber-physical systems, based on different assumptions and conditions. Previous work 
done in the field of robust control [28] is not extendable to our problem of security since 
attacks cannot be modeled as bounded disturbances and can be random in nature.  
In [29], LeBlanc, Zhang, Koutsoukos, Sundaram attempt to tackle the problem of 
intra-network consensus in the presence of faulty nodes. The strategy is based on local 
information and is resilient to breaches, with an assumption that the compromised nodes 
have knowledge of the other nodes on the network. The authors provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the functional nodes to reach consensus in the presence of 
adversarial nodes. They argue that connectivity is not adequate and instead suggest a 
unique graph property called network robustness. Mitra and Sundaram [30], describe the 
problem of distributed state estimation in Linear time-invariant systems using a network of 
sensors, wherein some sensors are attacked to report faulty measurements. They developed 
a secure estimation strategy given a bounded Byzantine attack model, where compromised 
nodes have knowledge of the system dynamics and deviate from normal operation. They 
present sufficient guarantees for their estimation strategy. The relationship between the 
dynamics of the system, the graph structure, and the measurement structure of the nodes is 
discussed. Zhang and Sundaram [31] developed a resilient median-based consensus 
algorithm in the presence of faulty nodes. They claim that the consensus algorithm is 
computationally lightweight and is efficacious for multiple fault models. In [32], Sundaram 





calculate an arbitrary state of the system in the presence of malicious/faulty nodes. They 
also calculate the maximum number of malicious nodes that the consensus algorithm can 
tolerate. 
Chabukswar, Mo, and Sinopoli [33], present a model based technique for detecting 
integrity attacks on sensors of a control system. They discuss the effect of an attack on a 
control system in steady state by replaying the sensor information. The paper then suggests 
a control algorithm that addresses this vulnerability by augmenting the controller using a 
zero-mean Gaussian authentication signal to the Linear Quadratic Gaussian optimal 
control. They also show that the authentication signal helps in detecting the replay attack 
with a side-effect of degraded control performance. They also structure a method to design 
the covariance of the authentication signal to reduce performance loss with detection 
guarantees. In [34], Mo, Weerakkody, Sinopoli suggest a method called physical 
watermarking as a method to ensure the correct operation of a control system. They identify 
that cryptography tools are ineffective against physical attacks on the system or internal or 
through malicious insiders. They suggest physical watermarking to physically authenticate 
cyber-physical components; given a noisy input sensor reading, the effect of the noisy 
measurement can be observed in the true output based on the system dynamics. An attacker 
cannot emulate the watermark because he cannot construct the output measurement that 
should correspond to the faulty sensor measurement.  
In [35], Pasqualetti et al. present a framework monitor to detect faults in linear 
systems and specifically in a power network caused by an adversary. They provide 
algorithms to design fault-monitoring filters for intruder detection. However, the number 





to concerns of scalability. Numerous researchers have attempted to model the attack and 
defense model within a game theory framework [36], [37], [38]. The attacker (modeled to 
maximize said cost) and the controller (modeled to minimize the same) are modeled as 
competitors in a game.  
In [39], Fawzi, Tabuada, and Diggavi present a secure state estimation method for 
arbitrary attacks on sensors and actuators with the assumption that the profile of the 
attacked sensors does not change. They show that one can design an output-feedback 
stabilization law using a state estimator resilient to attacks with a standard feedback law. 
In [40], Hu et al. present a secure state estimator that protects UAV against arbitrary and 
unbounded attacks, where the attacked sensors may change over time. The authors couple 
their secure state estimator with a standard Kalman filter (as a pre-filter) and identify better 
results. Shoukry et al. [41] present a secure state estimator using a satisfiability modulo 
theory approach. They leverage formal methods over real numbers to identify a secure state 
estimator that is sound, complete, and computationally efficient. They also present an upper 
bound on the runtime performance. Their analysis is made without assumptions about the 
attack model, on a multi-dimensional system with multiple sensors.  
Other attempts to solve the combinatorial state estimation problem have been done 
using brute force or convex relaxations. Chong et al. [42] present two different algorithms 
for secure state estimation. The algorithm uses the observability gramian and a consistency 
condition to select the correct estimate amongst multiple state estimates. They also present 
an observer that asymptotically converges to the right estimate based on the values of its 
past inputs and outputs. These approaches can be identified as brute force search 





with modeling errors. They also present a bound on the state estimation error. The authors 
model the state estimation problem as a 𝑙minimization problem which is then relaxed into 
a convex 𝑙%/𝑙	problem which can be solved in polynomial time. However, this relaxation 
may lead to incorrect estimates. 
The authors of [5], building on the work of [43], [44], and [45] present some of the 
novel work in the field of attack resilient cyber physical systems with a focus on attack 
resilient state estimators. [46], [47], [48], [49], and [50] present some more work on 
resilient state estimators for different attack models and assumptions. Pajic, Weimer, 
Bezzo, Sokolosky, Pappas, and Lee [5] describe their work on the development of an attack 
resilient cyber physical system and conclude with a case study on the cruise controller for 
an Autonomous Ground Vehicle. Following the work in [43], they address attack-resilient 
state estimation and provide respective robustness guarantees. They conclude that the 
maximal performance loss by a smart malicious agent exploiting the difference between 
the physical dynamic model of the system and the model used for state estimation is 
bounded and linear. The article also presents a technique to map latency, jitter, and 
synchronization faults to parameters of the state estimator. Thus, one may map control 
performance to real time specifications. Lastly, they discuss a technique to construct an 
assurance case which includes the model of the state estimator and the physical 
environment, along with the software structure of the controller. The modeling, robustness 
guarantees, and assumptions made throughout the study for the system of interest (model 






4.2. Resilient Sensor Fusion 
It is important to consider using redundant sensors to prevent a system breakdown due to 
sensor failure. Nonetheless, adding redundant sensors poses a new problem of fusing 
sensor measurements with varying and unpredictable error profiles. The system must 
identify faulty or error infused sensor readings from correct sensor readings.  
Sensor fusion discusses methods to combine data from independent sensors into 
one sensor reading while ensuring robustness, precision, accuracy, and reliability. 
Distributed sensing enables identifying the number of node failures the system can handle 
while maintaining correctness and reliability. This section examines and structures the 
problem of attack resilient sensor fusion for resilient state estimation in the presence of 
adversaries. Each sensor measurement is structured as an interval and the width of the 
interval is based on the noise profile of the sensor; reflecting the underlying accuracy of a 
sensor. The sensor fusion technique makes no assumptions about the system dynamics. 
Hence, a similar approach can be used for other comparable systems to structure resilient 
state estimators.  
The work integrates Brooks – Iyengar fusion, which outputs a fusion interval for a 
presumed set of compromised or spoofed sensors with the generic state estimator (Chapter 
3), to construct a resilient state estimator. A compromised/attacked sensor is any sensor 
that is under the effect of an adversary is defined.  
Sensor fusion is discussed in detail to highlight how a control system can be certain 
to make correct decisions in presence of compromised nodes or nodes under adversarial 
attacks. A summary of the Byzantine generals problem identified by Lamport et al. [51] is 





fusion architecture to address the Byzantine generals problem. Other sensor fusion 
algorithms that improve the precision and accuracy of the measurements taken by multiple 
sensor networks include Approximate Consensus [52], In-exact Consensus [53], Byzantine 
Vector Consensus [54], and Multidimensional Agreement [55]. But, as concluded in [56], 
refer to Table 3, Brooks-Iyengar Fusion is a superior algorithm when compared in terms 
of maximum faulty nodes, convergence rate, accuracy, and precision of each round; against 









Input scalar scalar vector interval interval/hybrid 
Faulty PEs 
tolerated 
< 𝑁/2 < 	𝑁/3 
≤ 	 (𝑁	 − 	1)/(𝑑	
+ 	2) 
< 	𝑁/3 < 	𝑁/3 
Maximum 
faulty PEs 
< 	𝑁/3 < 	2𝑁/3 
≤ 	 (𝑁	 − 	1)/(𝑑	
+ 	2) 
< 	𝑁/2 < 	𝑁/2 
Convergence 
rate [21] 
1/(1 + [𝑁	 − 2𝜏	
− 1]) 





in the convex 
hull 
[𝑎>n£¤, 𝑏>n£¤	] [𝑎>n£¤, 𝑏>n£¤	] 
Precision of 
each round 𝛿(𝑈)/2 2𝜏𝛿/𝑁 
(1 − 𝛾)(Ω¦	[𝑡







Table 3: Comparison of different sensor fusion techniques [56] 
The variables used in Table 3 are summarized below: 





2. 𝜏 is the number of faulty sensors 
3. 𝛿 𝑈 = max 𝑈 −min 𝑈   
4. 𝜅 refers to the accuracy, i.e., difference between the sensor’s observed value and 
the ground truth, i.e., max 𝑣 − 𝑣 ≤ 𝜅 
5. 𝑑 refers to the number of dimensions for BVC 
6. 𝛾 = %
£( ­(­®¯))
 
7. Ω¦ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥%°s±=𝑣s¦ 𝑡  in 𝑚 non-faulty sensors, where 𝑣s¦ 𝑡  is the 𝑙 − 𝑡ℎ entry of 
the vector of the 𝑘 − 𝑡ℎ sensor in the 𝑡 − 𝑡ℎ round. 
8. µ¦ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛%°s±=𝑣s¦ 𝑡  in 𝑚 non-faulty sensors, where 𝑣s¦ 𝑡  is the 𝑙 − 𝑡ℎ entry of 
the vector of the 𝑘 − 𝑡ℎ sensor in the 𝑡 − 𝑡ℎ round. 
9. 𝑏² = 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡	𝑒𝑛𝑑	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 ≤ 𝑤  
10. 𝑎² = 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡	𝑒𝑛𝑑	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 ≤ 𝑤	  
11. 𝛼 = £¤
('£¤)¤
  
4.3. Byzantine Generals Problem 
The Byzantine generals problem is a decision-making problem that was formalized by 
Lamport et al. [51], in which a commander-in-chief has multiple regiments of the 
Byzantine army camped outside an enemy city. Each regiment is commanded by a general 
and the generals can communicate with the generals only through a messenger. The 
generals must observe the enemy’s actions and deduce a common plan of action. Though, 
some of the generals may be traitors and may attempt to obstruct the loyal generals from 





order of a reliable commander-in-chief for success. The problem demands an algorithm 
such that: 
1. All generals decide on the same plan of action. 
2. A small number of traitors should not direct the generals towards adopting a 
wrong plan. 
3. One can easily draw parallels between the generals problem and our problem of 
sensor consensus/fusion by making necessary analogies. It can be restated as a 
system of N nodes, amongst which p may be faulty. The algorithm must ensure 
that: 
4. The non-faulty nodes must come to a consensus about the data received from 
another node Z. 
5. If Z is non-faulty, the consensus must match the message received from Z. 
4.4. Brooks-Iyengar Sensor Fusion 
A formalization of the Brooks-Iyengar Sensor Fusion is established in this section. Brooks-
Iyengar Sensor Fusion merges the Fast Convergence Algorithm (FCA) presented by 
Mahaney and Schneider [53] with the optimal region algorithm to produce the Brooks 
Iyengar Algorithm which has superior accuracy and precision for distributed decision 
making. The abovementioned optimal region algorithm is based on Brooks and Iyengar’s 
Multidimensional Agreement algorithm [57] and is comparable to Marzullo’s fusion 
algorithm [58].  
Given a system with 𝑛  sensors and 𝜁  faulty sensors. Each sensor presents its 
measurement as an interval constructed using its precision. The output of the algorithm 





The algorithm follows the work of [59], [56]: 
Algorithm 1: Brooks-Iyengar Sensor Fusion Algorithm 
Input: 
The measurements sent by sensor 𝑘 where 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁, and the interval received from 
sensor 𝑘 can be denoted as [𝑙s, ℎs]. Let 𝜁 be the number of faulty sensors. 
Output: 
As suggested earlier, the output is a point estimate and an interval of the measurement 
1. State estimator receives point estimate and corresponding interval from all the 
sensors. 
2. Take the union of the intervals of the collected measurements. 
3. Divide the union into mutually exclusive intervals based on the number of 
measurement intervals that intersect. We call the number of intersected intervals 
the weight for that interval. 
4. Identify intervals with weight less than 𝑁 − 𝜁. Let 𝑁 − 𝜁	be denoted as 𝐹. 
5. The set of remaining intervals 𝑆 = 𝐼%, 𝑤% … 𝐼¹, 𝑤¹  where 𝐼H	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑤H refer to 
the interval and weight for the 𝑖`º	sensor respectively 






7. The interval estimate is evaluated as (𝑙»h, ℎ»¼) 
 
 





𝑝H − 𝑝 ≤ 𝑏²n£½ − 𝑎²n£½ ≤ min½t% 𝑢 : 𝑢𝜖𝑈 	
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝑝H	𝑖𝑠	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡	𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟	𝑖, 𝑢 	𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ	𝑜𝑓	𝑢	
𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑏² = 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡	𝑒𝑛𝑑	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 ≤ 𝑤	
𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑎² = 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡	𝑒𝑛𝑑	𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 ≤ 𝑤 
Also, the precision of the sensor fusion measurement can be calculated as in [56]: 
1
1 + 𝛼 𝑏²n£½ − 𝑎²n£½ 	
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝛼 =
𝑁 − 𝜁
(2𝑁 − 𝜁)𝜁 
4.5. System Description 
Our system has 𝑛 sensors measuring some physical variables and communicating with the 
flight controller over a shared bus. The sensors deliver the measurement in the form of 
intervals. The controller then calculates an interval containing all possible values of the 
true state based on the given precision. Given a precision guarantee of ∆, an interval sized 
2∆ is constructed around the sensor measurement. The interval size may be expanded based 
on implementation restraints and delay or jitter sensitivities. The controller on receiving n 
intervals, fuses the measurements assuming 𝑓  faulty sensors. The fusion operates 
conservatively. A sensor is correct if its interval contains the true state value.  
4.5.1. Problem Statement 
The problem in this work is to neutralize an attack on the sensors. The attacker’s policy to 
maximize the impact of the attack is first formalized. The goal is to reach the correct state 





4.5.2. Attack Model 
The fact that adversaries may control/spoof what sensor measurements are being passed to 
the controller is assumed. The attacker’s goal is to maximize the fused interval and lead to 
an incorrect point measurement while remaining undetected. Thus, the attacker can spoof 
the sensors to maximize the width of the fusion interval and greatly disrupt the performance 
of an air vehicle. As discussed in section 2.3.2.4, there are multiple ways of spoofing 
sensors, either by modifying the software of the flight controller or through physical means.  
Our attack model discusses attacks on the IMU of the MAV. As examined in 
chapter 3, since our state estimator uses the IMU readings instead of the MAV dynamic 
model to estimate the state, the system is heavily dependent on the IMU readings to ensure 
correct state estimation and consequently stable control.  
The defense model is to use multiple IMUs to ensure no single point of failure. This 
is a viable solution, since IMUs are inexpensive, have low power requirements, and are 
light-weight. At the same time, one may also argue that compromising all the IMUs on a 
given system is not possible. Also, it may be possible that not all the components of the 
IMU are compromised and may partly be functional. The system has multiple sensors that 
measure the angular velocity and linear acceleration. Before the sensor readings are sent to 
the controller, the readings are passed through a pre-filter to assess for possible attacks or 






Figure 12: Defense strategy against sensor spoofing attacks 
 
4.5.3. Fusion Methodology 
Brooks and Iyengar proposed an interval-based resilient sensor fusion algorithm, wherein 
the accuracy of the fused sensor reading is better than the individual sensor readings. The 
fusion algorithm provides a point estimate as well as an interval around the point estimate. 
The interval size is bounded if the number of faulty sensors are bounded. Brooks Iyengar 
fusion assumes an upper bound on the number of faulty measurements or sensors, i.e., 𝑛/3. 
The defense model is to use multiple IMUs to 
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The fusion algorithm outputs a fusion interval that is guaranteed to contain the true 
value. As discussed in 5.2. the fusion algorithm identifies the intersecting intervals and the 
corresponding weights. The fused estimate and interval is calculated by taking a weighted 
average of the intervals. 
1. If 𝑓 < 𝑛/3, then the fusion interval is bounded by a correct interval. 
2.  If 𝑓 < 𝑛/2, then the fusion interval is bounded by an interval which might 
not be correct.  
3. If 𝑓 ≥ 𝑛/2, then the fusion interval is not bounded and may not contain the 
correct measurement; where 𝑓	is the number of attacked sensors. 
4. For our analysis, we assume 𝒇 < 𝒏/𝟑. 
4.5.4. Attack Detection: 
The fusion algorithm as discussed in section 4.5.3. detects an attack by checking if an 
interval intersects the calculated fusion interval (from the un-attacked sensors). Intervals 
not intersecting the fusion interval correspond to the attacked sensor since they cannot 
contain the true value. A possible criticism of this sensor algorithm is that it handles sensor 
faults and sensor attacks equivalently.  
4.6. Secure State Estimator Structure 
A state estimator that uses Brook Iyengar Fusion to fuse the sensor readings from IMUs 
prior to feeding the angular velocity and linear acceleration measurements into the EKF 
based state estimator as discussed in chapter 4 is proposed. A model of our state estimator 






Figure 13: Secure State Estimator 
4.7. Summary 
In this chapter, a state of the art state estimation framework with an attack resilient sensor 
fusion technique to defend MAVs against sensor attacks was integrated. As highlighted in 
chapter 3, the IMU forms the core of the state estimation process. Since, IMUs are 
lightweight and have low energy requirements, we advocate using redundant IMUs to 
prevent a single point of failure and a compromised system. Consequently, we identify 
Brooks Iyengar Sensor Fusion as an attack resilient sensor fusion technique. The 
improvements in the state estimation resilience is exemplified through the simulations in 
Chapter 5. The experiments show that the resilient state estimator can correctly estimate 





5. Results and Analysis 
The results of the software in the loop simulation are discussed in this section. Following 
which is an analysis to verify the proposed state estimator’s performance and inferences 
that may be drawn from the results. The simulator was programmed in MATLAB 
(MATLABR_2015A) on a standard MacOSX personal computer. The simulations used the 
EuRoC MAV dataset [60], [61]. Available data includes [61]: 
• Stereo Images (Aptina MT9V034 global shutter, WVGA monochrome, 2×20 FPS)  
• MEMS IMU (ADIS16448, angular rate and acceleration, 200 Hz) 
• VICON motion capture system (6D pose)  
• Leica MS50 laser tracker (3D position)  
The dataset represents the sensor measurements of a MAV following programmed 
waypoints. The simulation represents a MAV installed with multiple IMUs, and is also 
receiving position measurements from a Leica Total Station. The outputs of these sensors 
are fused together to generate an estimate for the position, velocity, and attitude of the 
system. One or some of these IMU measurements are attacked. A uniformly distributed 
random attack is simulated. The comparative performance of the state estimators in 
different conditions is presented. Please note that the simulations of the state estimator do 
not include of the control dynamics and response of the system. While examining the 
performance of the generic state estimator in the presence of adversarial attacks, it is vital 
to respect that the deference of the estimated state from the ground truth will be amplified 
by the response of the flight controller. The flight controller which was programmed to 





attitude control calculations based on the incorrect state estimate. This will lead to incorrect 
actuator controls and lead the quadrotor to incorrect positions and lead to a greater state 
estimate error. This effect will be propagated and lead to a severely erroneous system 
performance and unpredictable behavior. Incorrect control signals in unknown states may 
possibly lead to the system crashing due to compounding error factors. For all the 
simulations, the blue trajectory is the estimated position of the MAV state estimator, and 
the red trajectory is the ground truth trajectory obtained from the VICON motion capture 
system. Broadly, the simulations in this section describe: 
5.1. Generic state estimator performance without compromised sensors. 
 
This simulation (Figure 14) describes the performance of the generic state estimator when 
the sensors are operating correctly. The red trajectory represents the ground truth 
coordinates obtained from the VICON tracker. The blue trajectory is the estimated position 
of the MAV state estimator. The axes are indicative of the position along the X, Y, Z 
directions. 
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Figure 15, Figure 16, Figure 17 represent the estimated X, Y, and Z positions of the 
MAV (blue trajectory) along with the ground truth X, Y, and Z positions of the MAV 
(red trajectory). The state estimator correctly tracks the position of the MAV. 
 
Figure 15: Position of Quadrotor along X-axis in nominal conditions while using the 
standard state estimator 
 
Figure 16: Position of Quadrotor along Y-axis in nominal conditions while using the 
standard state estimator. 
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Figure 17: Position of Quadrotor along Z-axis in nominal conditions while using the 
standard state estimator. 
5.2. Generic state estimator performance in the presence of sensor attacks. 
This simulation (Figure 18) describes the performance of the generic state estimator when 
the IMU is under attack. The red trajectory represents the ground truth coordinates obtained 
from the VICON tracker. The blue trajectory is the estimated position of the MAV state 
estimator. The axes are indicative of the position along the X, Y, Z directions. The state 
estimator fails to estimate the position of the MAV. 
 
Figure 18: Trajectory of a Quadrotor under adversarial attacks while using the standard 
state estimator 
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Figure 19, Figure 20, Figure 21 represent the estimated X, Y, and Z positions of the MAV 
(blue trajectory) along with the ground truth X, Y, and Z positions of the MAV (red 
trajectory). 
 
Figure 19: Position of Quadrotor along X-axis under adversarial attacks while using the 
standard state estimator 
 
 
Figure 20: Position of Quadrotor along Y-axis under adversarial attacks while using the 
standard state estimator. 
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Figure 21: Position of Quadrotor along Z-axis under adversarial attacks while using the 
standard state estimator. 
5.3. Secure state estimator performance in the presence of sensor attacks. 
This simulation (Figure 22) describes the performance of the resilient state estimator when 
the sensors are operating correctly. The red trajectory represents the ground truth 
coordinates obtained from the VICON tracker. The blue trajectory is the estimated position 
of the MAV state estimator. The axes are indicative of the position along the X, Y, Z 
directions. 
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Figure 22: Trajectory of a Quadrotor under adversarial attacks while using the secure 
state estimator. 
Figure 23, Figure 24, Figure 25 represent the estimated X, Y, and Z positions of the MAV 
(blue trajectory) along with the ground truth X, Y, and Z positions of the MAV (red 
trajectory). We observe an improved performance of the state estimation process with the 
integrated resilient sensor fusion module. The resilient state estimator correctly estimates 
the state of the MAV. 
 
Figure 23: Position of Quadrotor along X-axis under adversarial attacks while using the 
secure state estimator. 
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Figure 24: Position of Quadrotor along Y-axis under adversarial attacks while using the 
secure state estimator. 
 
Figure 25: Position of Quadrotor along Z-axis under adversarial attacks while using the 
secure state estimator. 
5.4. Quantitative Comparison 
We evaluate the performance of the state estimators based on the Hausdorff distance [62]. 
The Hausdorff distance is a metric that compares the distance between two sets of spaces. 
It is used as a measure of trajectory similarity. The results of the Hausdorff distance 
calculations are mentioned in Table 4. A smaller value indicates a high similarity between 
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two trajectories. In the simulations, the ground truth trajectory and the estimated 




Generic State Estimator without Attack 0.3717 
Generic State Estimator with sensors under attack 5.9983 
Resilient State Estimator with sensors under attack 0.4819 
Table 4: Quantitative comparison of State Estimator Performance 
5.5. Summary 
This chapter presents a proof of concept for the performance of the integrated resilient state 
estimator for MAVs in the presence of attacks on the IMU. The generic state estimator fails 
to correctly estimate the state of the MAV in the presence of attacks on the MAV (Figures 
18 – 21). However, as observed in Figures 22 – 25, the resilient state estimator could 
successfully estimate the position of the MAV. A quantitative comparison between the 
state estimators is also presented in the form of the Hausdorff distance metric. In the next 







6. Conclusion and Future Work 
The thesis investigated and presented a solution to the resilient state estimation problem. 
We integrated a state of the art state estimator with a resilient sensor fusion technique, and 
could reconstruct the state of the MAV in the presence of adversarial attacks. This is vital 
for existing commercial MAVs, for future drone delivery systems, and for other 
applications of MAVs. The proposed resilient state estimator makes no assumptions about 
the attack signal model. 
Based on the formalization of Brooks Iyengar Fusion, one can fuse the 
measurements from the attacked sensors to give an accurate fused point estimate and an 
interval. Brooks Iyengar fusion is combined and used as a pre-filter to the EKF based state 
estimator for fusing multiple sensor measurements of the same physical signal. The 
performance of the generic state estimator and the proposed resilient state estimator is 
compared after introducing an attack on a sensor, i.e., modifying sensor readings. 
Specifically, simulations to show the performance of secure state estimators in navigation 
of a quadrotor under sensor attacks on the IMU, refer to Figure 10 – Figure 21. The number 
of attacks that can be tolerated, i.e., the number of sensors that can be attacked is a 
maximum of 𝑛/3 sensors while maintaining safe operation. 
6.1. Contributions 
The research goals were identified in the beginning of the thesis and have been addressed. 
The security vulnerabilities of MAVs, i.e., the different threat vectors were identified in 
chapter 2 (RG-1). In chapter 3, the current state of the art state estimation technique used 





estimator. Propositions to improve the existing state estimator were stated in chapter 4, 
where Brooks-Iyengar sensor fusion was identified as a viable solution (RG - 2 & RG - 3). 
Chapter 5 offered a proof-of-concept for our resilient state estimator (RG - 4) through a 
case study. 
The primary contributions of this thesis are: 
1. By understanding the state estimation process of MAVs, we identify the importance 
of the IMU as the most vulnerable attack surface for a MAV.  
2. Having identified the IMU as the most vulnerable component of the MAV state 
estimation process, we develop a resilient state estimator for the MAV using 
existing results in resilient fusion. An important feature of the fusion algorithm is 
that it makes no assumptions about the system dynamics. 
3. The resilient state estimator was validated by implementing it on a real dataset 
containing IMU, Leica, VICON data obtained from a MAV. The performance of 
the resilient state estimator is exemplified in chapter 5.  
As a final comment, it is important to admit that much of the motivation and enthusiasm 
for this work is derived from the foresight of the future of MAVs. In the end, it is this vision 
that provided the guiding framework. However, it is equally critical to realize that many of 
the results and techniques developed in this thesis are not limited to MAVs. For example, 
a similar pre-filter sensor fusion approach is likely to be relevant for other autonomous 
vehicles – for autonomous cars, such redundancy could be useful for wheel encoders 
measuring the velocity of the car. Thus, even though MAVs motivated this thesis, its 





6.2. Future Work 
Future directions for the work are to construct a resilient state estimator by adding 
redundancy in measured variables measured by different types of sensors. For example, if 
one wants to secure the velocity of a given MAV. Instead of using velocity measurements 
from redundant sensors of a single type that measure velocity like a GPS, the estimator can 
be modified to fuse measured velocity from different sensors like a GPS, IMU, Camera, 
LIDAR, etc. Redundancy through a broader range of sensors will make the system even 
more robust. One can also improve the attack detection procedure by leveraging the 
system’s dynamical model. 
Moreover, a major underlying assumption is that uncompromised sensors provide 
error-free measurements. An extension of this work would be to introduce random faults 
in the sensor measurements and study the system performance in more generalized 
conditions.  
Another possible extension of this work is to incorporate sensor measurement 
history to better tune the state estimator to ignore faulty measurements. One may utilize 
past measurements in conjunction with a dynamical model of the system to reduce the size 
of the convex hull of the measurement intervals of the sensor readings and improve the 
precision of the fusion algorithm.  
Finally, to better study the performance of the resilient state estimator, the next step 
is to implement a controller for the MAV and observe the response of the MAV when it 






Appendix A presents the MATLAB code and helper functions used to simulate the state 
estimator. 
1. Main Function 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Simulator - Main Function 
%  




%   title={Indirect Kalman filter for 3D attitude estimation}, 
%   author={Trawny, Nikolas and Roumeliotis, Stergios I}, 
%   journal={University of Minnesota, Dept. of Comp. Sci. \& Eng., Tech. Rep}, 
%   volume={2}, 





%-----------------------Defining Filter Parameters------------------------- 







r=0.1;    %std of measurement 
errZ=0.01*eye(3); %Leica Measurement Noise Covariance Matrix 






Qc=[varMatNa zer zer zer; 
    zer varMatBa zer zer; 
    zer zer varMatNw zer; 
    zer zer zer varMatBw]; 
%-----------------------------Alotting Space------------------------------- 




P = eye(n-1);                           % initial state covraiance                                     
% total dynamic steps                         
%------------------------Feed Sensor Data------------------------------ 
fileID = fopen('imu.csv'); 
csvRawData = textscan(fileID, '%u64,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f', 'headerLines', 1); 
imudata1.t = csvRawData{1}'; 
imudata1.omega = [csvRawData{2}, csvRawData{3}, csvRawData{4}]'; 
imudata1.a = [csvRawData{5}, csvRawData{6}, csvRawData{7}]'; 
fileID = fopen('imu.csv'); 
csvRawData = textscan(fileID, '%u64,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f', 'headerLines', 1); 
imudata2.t = csvRawData{1}'; 
imudata2.omega = [csvRawData{2}, csvRawData{3}, csvRawData{4}]'; 







  imudata2.omega=imudata2.omega; 
fileID = fopen('imu.csv'); 
csvRawData = textscan(fileID, '%u64,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f', 'headerLines', 1); 
%Attacked IMU 
  
imudata3.t = csvRawData{1}'; 
imudata3.omega = [csvRawData{2}, csvRawData{3}, csvRawData{4}]'; 
imudata3.a = [csvRawData{5}, csvRawData{6}, csvRawData{7}]'; 
imudata3.a= imudata3.a+varNa*randn(3,36820); 
imudata4.t = csvRawData{1}'; 
imudata4.omega = [csvRawData{2}, csvRawData{3}, csvRawData{4}]'; 
imudata4.a = [csvRawData{5}, csvRawData{6}, csvRawData{7}]'; 
imudata4.a= imudata4.a+varNa*randn(3,36820); 
fileID = fopen('leica.csv'); 
csvRawData = textscan(fileID, '%u64,%f,%f,%f', 'headerLines', 1); 
leicadata.t = csvRawData{1}'; 
leicadata.pos = [csvRawData{2}, csvRawData{3}, csvRawData{4}]'; 
fileID = fopen('ground.csv'); 
csvRawData = textscan(fileID, 
'%u64,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f,%f', 'headerLines', 1); 
grounddata.t = csvRawData{1}'; 
grounddata.pos = [csvRawData{2}, csvRawData{3}, csvRawData{4}]'; 
grounddata.vel=[csvRawData{5}, csvRawData{6}, csvRawData{7}]'; 
grounddata.quat=[csvRawData{8}, csvRawData{9}, 
csvRawData{10},csvRawData{11}]'; 
grounddata.biasw=[csvRawData{12}, csvRawData{13}, csvRawData{14}]'; 
grounddata.biasa=[csvRawData{15}, csvRawData{16}, csvRawData{17}]'; 
prevTime=min(imudata1.t(1),leicadata.t(1)); 
measItr=1; 











    if(imudata1.t(k)<leicadata.t(measItr)) 
        currTime=imudata1.t(k); 
        g=[0;0;9.8]; 
        dt=double(currTime-prevTime)/1e9; 
        sV(1:3,ctr)=leicadata.pos(1:3,measItr); 
        w0=imudata2.omega(1:3,k-1); 
        w1=imudata2.omega(1:3,k); 
%        a11=marzulloFusion({[imudata1.a(1,k)-2.5,imudata1.a(1,k)+1],[imudata2.a(1,k)-
8,imudata2.a(1,k)+7],[imudata3.a(1,k)-2,imudata3.a(1,k)+1],[imudata4.a(1,k)-
1,imudata4.a(1,k)+2]},4,1); 
%         a12=marzulloFusion({[imudata1.a(2,k)-2.5,imudata1.a(2,k)+1],[imudata2.a(2,k)-
8,imudata2.a(2,k)+7],[imudata3.a(2,k)-2,imudata3.a(2,k)+1],[imudata4.a(2,k)-
1,imudata4.a(2,k)+2]},4,1); 
%         a13=marzulloFusion({[imudata1.a(3,k)-2.5,imudata1.a(3,k)+1],[imudata2.a(3,k)-
8,imudata2.a(3,k)+7],[imudata3.a(3,k)-2,imudata3.a(3,k)+1],[imudata4.a(3,k)-
1,imudata4.a(3,k)+2]},4,1); 
%         a1=[a11;a12;a13]; 
%         a11=approxAgreement([imudata1.a(1,k);imudata2.a(1,k);imudata3.a(1,k);imudat
a4.a(1,k)],1); 
%         a12=approxAgreement([imudata1.a(2,k);imudata2.a(2,k);imudata3.a(2,k);imudat
a4.a(2,k)],1); 
%         a13=approxAgreement([imudata1.a(3,k);imudata2.a(3,k);imudata3.a(3,k);imudat
a4.a(3,k)],1); 










        a12=sensorFusion({[imudata1.a(2,k)-0.5,imudata1.a(2,k)+0.5],[imudata2.a(2,k)-
0.5,imudata2.a(2,k)+0.5],[imudata3.a(2,k)-0.5,imudata3.a(2,k)+0.5],[imudata4.a(2,k)-
0.5,imudata4.a(2,k)+0.5]},4,1); 
        a13=sensorFusion({[imudata1.a(3,k)-0.5,imudata1.a(3,k)+0.5],[imudata2.a(3,k)-
0.5,imudata2.a(3,k)+0.5],[imudata3.a(3,k)-0.5,imudata3.a(3,k)+0.5],[imudata4.a(3,k)-
0.5,imudata4.a(3,k)+0.5]},4,1); 
        a1=[a11;a12;a13]; 
        pos_hat_avg_0=xV(1:3,ctr-1); 
        vel_hat_avg_0=xV(4:6,ctr-1); 
        q_hat_avg_0 = xV(7:10,ctr-1); 
        bw=xV(11:13,ctr-1); 
        ba = xV(14:16,ctr-1); 
        lambda = xV(17,ctr-1); 
        posgps = xV(18:20,ctr-1); 
        C=qGetRotation(q_hat_avg_0); 
        w_hat_0 = w0; 
        %State Propogation 
        % We instead proceed as follows: 
        % 1. We propagate the bias (assuming the bias is constant over the integration 
interval) 
        ba1 = ba; % TODO : Here is a problem : we have no way of validating or updating 
the bias. Update it externally periodically can do the trick. 
        bw1 = bw; 
        % 2. Using the measurement w1 and b1, we form the estimate of the new turn rate 
w_hat_1 
        w_hat_1 = w1-bw1 ; 





        % 3. We propagate the quaternion using a first order integrator with w_hat_0 and 
w_hat_1 tp obtain q_hat_avg_1 
        w_avg = (w_hat_0 + w_hat_1) / 2; 
        pos_hat_avg_1= pos_hat_avg_0+vel_hat_avg_0*dt; 
        vel_hat_avg_1=vel_hat_avg_0+a_hat_1*dt; 
        q_hat_avg_1 = NormalizeV((expm(1/2*Omega(w_avg)*dt) + 
1/48*(Omega(w_hat_1)*Omega(w_hat_0) - Omega(w_hat_0)*Omega(w_hat_1))*dt^2) 
* q_hat_avg_0); 
        lambda1=lambda; 
        posgps1=posgps; 
        C=qGetRotation(q_hat_avg_1); 
        xV(:,ctr)=[pos_hat_avg_1;vel_hat_avg_1;q_hat_avg_1;bw1;ba1;lambda1;posgps1]; 
        F = propogateMatrix(a1,w1,ba1,bw1,C,dt); 
        Qd=returnQd(a1,w1,ba1,bw1,C,dt,Qc); 
        % 5. We Compute the state covariance matrix according to the Extended Kalman 
Filter equation 
        P=double(P); 
        P = double(F*P*F' + Qd); 
        prevTime=imudata1.t(k); 
        k=k+1; 
        ctr=ctr+1; 
    else 
        currTime=leicadata.t(measItr); 
        dt=double(currTime-prevTime)/1e9; 
        sV(1:3,ctr)=leicadata.pos(1:3,measItr); 
        w0=imudata2.omega(1:3,k-1); 
        w1=imudata2.omega(1:3,k); 







%         a12=marzulloFusion({[imudata1.a(2,k)-2.5,imudata1.a(2,k)+1],[imudata2.a(2,k)-
8,imudata2.a(2,k)+7],[imudata3.a(2,k)-2,imudata3.a(2,k)+1],[imudata4.a(2,k)-
1,imudata4.a(2,k)+2]},4,1); 
%         a13=marzulloFusion({[imudata1.a(3,k)-2.5,imudata1.a(3,k)+1],[imudata2.a(3,k)-
8,imudata2.a(3,k)+7],[imudata3.a(3,k)-2,imudata3.a(3,k)+1],[imudata4.a(3,k)-
1,imudata4.a(3,k)+2]},4,1); 





%         a12=approxAgreement([imudata1.a(2,k);imudata2.a(2,k);imudata3.a(2,k);imudat
a4.a(2,k)],1); 
%         a13=approxAgreement([imudata1.a(3,k);imudata2.a(3,k);imudata3.a(3,k);imudat
a4.a(3,k)],1); 




        a12=sensorFusion({[imudata1.a(2,k)-0.5,imudata1.a(2,k)+0.5],[imudata2.a(2,k)-
0.5,imudata2.a(2,k)+0.5],[imudata3.a(2,k)-0.5,imudata3.a(2,k)+0.5],[imudata4.a(2,k)-
0.5,imudata4.a(2,k)+0.5]},4,1); 
        a13=sensorFusion({[imudata1.a(3,k)-0.5,imudata1.a(3,k)+0.5],[imudata2.a(3,k)-
0.5,imudata2.a(3,k)+0.5],[imudata3.a(3,k)-0.5,imudata3.a(3,k)+0.5],[imudata4.a(3,k)-
0.5,imudata4.a(3,k)+0.5]},4,1); 
        a1=[a11;a12;a13]; 
        pos1=leicadata.pos(1:3,measItr); 
        [xV(:,ctr),P]=ekf(Qc,xV(:,ctr-1),P,[w0 w1],a1,pos1,errZ,dt); 
        P=double(P); 
        prevTime=leicadata.t(measItr); 





        ctr=ctr+1; 







title('Position in 3-D Frame(Trajectory)') 
xlabel('Position along X axis(m)') 
ylabel('Position along Y axis(m)') 
zlabel('Position along Z axis(m)') 






title('X Coordinate Estimate and Actual Value') 
ylabel('Position along X axis(m)') 
xlabel('Time(s)') 






title('Y Coordinate Estimate and Actual Value') 
ylabel('Position along Y axis(m)') 
xlabel('Time(s)') 










title('Z Coordinate Estimate and Actual Value') 
ylabel('Position along Z axis(m)') 
xlabel('Time(s)') 
legend('Estimated Position','Ground Truth','Location','northwest'); 
  
2. EKF Function 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Simulator - Extended Kalman Filter 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible for the EKF Predict and Update 
% steps. 
function [ xV1, P1] = ekf( Qc,xV0, P0, w,a1,gps0,  errZ, dt) 
% xV0 = current estimate of state 
% w1=input gyroscope readings 
% a1 = input accelerometer readings 
% gps0 = input gps readings 
% P0 = state covariance matrix 
% Qc = noise covariance matrix 







% We have gyroscope measurements w0 and w1.  
w0 = w(:,1); 
w1 = w(:,2); 
% Gravity 
g=[0;0;9.8]; 
% We have an estimate of the quaternion q_hat_avg and the bias b0 
% xV0 = [pos; vel; q_hat_avg_0 ;ba; bw;lambda;pos] 
pos_hat_avg_0=xV0(1:3); 
vel_hat_avg_0=xV0(4:6); 
q_hat_avg_0 = xV0(7:10); 
bw_0=xV0(11:13); 
ba_0 = xV0(14:16); 
lambda_0 = xV0(17); 
posgps_0 = xV0(18:20); 
  
C=qGetRotation(q_hat_avg_0); 
w_hat_0 = w0 - bw_0-varNw*randn; 
%% State Prediction 
% Propagate the bias 
ba1 = ba_0;  
bw1 = bw_0; 
% Estimate new angular velocity and linear acceleration using the measurement w1 and 
b1 
w_hat_1 = w1 - bw1-varNw*randn; 
a_hat_1 = C'*(a1 - ba1-varNa*randn)-g; 
% Propagate the quaternion using first order integrator  







q_hat_avg_1 = NormalizeV((exp(1/2*Omega(w_avg)*dt) + 





% Compute the transition matrix F and Qd 
C=qGetRotation(q_hat_avg_1); 
F = propogateMatrix(a1,w1,ba1,bw1,C,dt); 
Qd=returnQd(a1,w1,ba1,bw1,C,dt,Qc); 
% Update the state covariance matrix  
P1_ = F*P0*F' + Qd; 
  
%% Compute Kalman Gain 
% Calculate the measurement matrix H  
H = returnH(lambda1,C,posgps1,pos_hat_avg_1); 
S = H*P1_*H' + errZ; 
K = P1_*(H'*inv(S)); 
  




if (dq'*dq) > 1 
    dq_hat_avg_1 = (1/sqrt(1 + (dq'*dq))) * [dq ; 1]; 
else 
    dq_hat_avg_1 = [dq ; (sqrt(1 - (dq'*dq)))]; 
end 








P1 = double((eye(19) - K*H) * P1_ * (eye(19) - K*H)' + K*errZ*K'); 
end 
3. Brooks Iyengar Sensor Fusion Function 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Simulator - Brooks Iyengar Fusion 
%  
% Description:This function is used to fuse the readings from the IMUs 




function [pointEstimate] = sensorFusion(intervals, N, a) 
     
    %Divide intervals into mutually exclusive intervals...HOW? 
     
    %create empty array that will store all possible interval bounds (upper as well as 
lower, independently) 
    I = []; 
     
    %now fill up this array with all values from intervals 
    for i = 1 : N 
        I = [I intervals{i}(1) intervals{i}(2)]; 





     
    % delete repeated values from this array and sort it 
    I = unique(I); 
     
    %now create an empty cell array, each of whose entries will store the 
    %newly created intervals from I(i) & I(i+1), as well as the weights of 
    %each interval 
    A = {}; 
    for i = 1 : (length(I) - 1) 
        w = 0; 
        x1 = I(i); 
        y1 = I(i+1); 
        for j = 1 : N 
            x2 = intervals{j}(1); 
            y2 = intervals{j}(2); 
            %fprintf("[%f,%f] ... [%f,%f] ... ? \n",x1,y1,x2,y2) 
            if ((x1 <= x2) && (x2 < y1)) || ((x1 < y2) && (y2 < y1)) || ((x1 >= x2) && (x1 < 
y2)) || ((y1 > x2)&&(y1 < y2)) 
                w = w + 1; 
                %fprintf("\tyes! w = %d\n") 
            end 
        end 
        A{i} = {[x1, y1],w}; 
        %fprintf("[%f, %f],%d\n",A{i}{1}(1),A{i}{1}(2),A{i}{2}) 
    end 
  
    %Let's say after the above step, we obtain our new intervals with the 
    %corresponding weights 
    %remove intervals with weights less than N - a  
    %{ 





        %disp(A{i}{1}(1)) 
        %disp(A{i}{1}(2)) 
        w = (A{i}{2}); 
        if (w < N - a) 
            A(:,i) = []; 
            disp(A{i}) 
        end 
    end 
    %} 
     
    %let's just print A to see everything is fine 
     
    %{ 
    for i = 1 : length(A) 
        fprintf("[%f, %f],%d\n",A{i}{1}(1),A{i}{1}(2),A{i}{2})   
    end 
    %} 
     
     
    foundFirstInterval = false; 
    lastInterval = 0; 
    firstInterval = 0; 
     
    P_E_Numerator = 0; 
    P_E_Denominator = 0; 
     
    for i = 1 : length(A) 
        if(A{i}{2} >= N-a) 
            %fprintf("%d >= %d ? \n",A{i}{2}, N-a) 
            if (foundFirstInterval == false)  





                firstInterval = A{i}{1}(1); %first found interval where W >= N-a is the overall 
lower interval 
            end 
            lastInterval = A{i}{1}(2);      %last interval will always be the latest interval for 
W >= N-a 
            P_E_Numerator = P_E_Numerator + A{i}{2}*(A{i}{1}(1) + A{i}{1}(2))/2; 
            P_E_Denominator = P_E_Denominator + A{i}{2}; 
        end 
    end 
     
    pointEstimate = P_E_Numerator / P_E_Denominator  ;   %Final point estimate 
    outputIntervals = [firstInterval, lastInterval]  ;   %Final intervals 
end 
4. Helper Functions 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Skew Matrix 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible for returning the skew matrix 
% representation for a said quaternion vector. 
function [ quatx ] = skew( quat )    
    quatx = [ 0   -quat(3)  quat(2); 
          quat(3)   0   -quat(1); 







% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Noise Covariance Matrix 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible for calculating the system noise 
% covariance matrix. 
  
function Qd=returnQd(a,w,ba,bw,C,dt,Qc) 
      
     if (dt~=0) 
        Qc(1:3,:)=Qc(1:3,:)/dt; 
        Qc(4:6,:)=Qc(4:6,:)*dt; 
        Qc(7:9,:)=Qc(7:9,:)/dt; 
        Qc(10:12,:)=Qc(10:12,:)*dt; 
     end 
     
         
  
    zero=zeros(3,3); 
    iden=eye(3,3); 
    a=a-ba; 
    w=w-bw; 
    A=-C'*skew(a)*((iden*((dt^2)/2))-
(((dt^3)/6)*skew(w))+(((dt^4)/24)*skew(w)*skew(w))); 






    Ch=-C'*skew(a)*((iden*dt)-(((dt^2)/4)*skew(w))+(((dt^3)/6)*skew(w)*skew(w))); 
    D=-A; 
    E=iden-dt*skew(w)+0.5*dt*dt*skew(w)*skew(w); 
    F=-iden*dt+0.5*dt*dt*skew(w)-((dt^3)/6)*skew(w)*skew(w); 
    Fd=double([iden dt*iden A B -C'*dt*dt*(1/2) zeros(3,4); 
        zero iden Ch D -C'*dt zeros(3,4); 
        zero zero E F zero zeros(3,4); 
        zero zero zero iden zero zeros(3,4); 
        zero zero zero zero iden zeros(3,4); 
        zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,4)]); 
    G=[zero zero zero zero; 
       -C' zero zero zero; 
       zero zero -iden zero; 
       zero zero zero iden; 
       zero iden zero zero; 
       zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3)]; 




% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Observation Matrix 
%  








    H1=lambda*eye(3,3); 
    zer=zeros(3,3); 
    H3=-C'*skew(ps)*lambda; 
    H6=pw+C'*ps; 
    H7=C'*lambda; 
    H=double([H1 ;zer; H3; zer ;zer; H6'; H7]');  
     
end 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017  
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Multiply Quaternions 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible for multiplying two quaternions 
  
function mult=quaternionMult(q_quat,p) 
    mult=[q_quat(4)*p(1) + q_quat(3)*p(2) - q_quat(2)*p(3) + q_quat(1)*p(4); 
-q_quat(3)*p(1) + q_quat(4)*p(2) + q_quat(1)*p(3) + q_quat(2)*p(4); 
q_quat(2)*p(1) - q_quat(1)*p(2) + q_quat(4)*p(3) + q_quat(3)*p(4); 
-q_quat(1)*p(1) - q_quat(2)*p(2) - q_quat(3)*p(3) + q_quat(4)*p_quat(4)]; 
end 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 






% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Rotation Matrix 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible for calculating the rotation 
% matrix for the quaternion vector 
  
function c = qGetRotation( quat ) 
c = eye(3) - 2*quat(4)*skew(quat) + 2*(skew(quat)*skew(quat)); 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Propogate Matrix 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible propogating the state variable 
% and updating the covariance matrix. 
 
function x=propogateMatrix(a,w,ba,bw,C,dt) 
    zero=zeros(3,3); 
    iden=eye(3,3); 
    a=a-ba; 
    w=w-bw; 
    A=-C'*skew(a)*((iden*((dt^2)/2))-
(((dt^3)/6)*skew(w))+(((dt^4)/24)*skew(w)*skew(w))); 
    B=-C'*skew(a)*(-(iden*((dt^3)/6))+(((dt^4)/24)*skew(w))-
(((dt^5)/120)*skew(w)*skew(w))); 
    Ch=-C'*skew(a)*((iden*dt)-(((dt^2)/4)*skew(w))+(((dt^3)/6)*skew(w)*skew(w))); 





    E=iden-dt*skew(w)+0.5*dt*dt*skew(w)*skew(w); 
    F=-iden*dt+0.5*dt*dt*skew(w)-((dt^3)/6)*skew(w)*skew(w); 
    x=double([iden dt*iden A B -C'*dt*dt*(1/2) zeros(3,4); 
        zero iden Ch D -C'*dt zeros(3,4); 
        zero zero E F zero zeros(3,4); 
        zero zero zero iden zero zeros(3,4); 
        zero zero zero zero iden zeros(3,4); 
        zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,4)]); 
end 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Omega Representation 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible for evaluating the omega 
% representation based on the angular velocity. 
function [omega] = Omega(w) 
    omega = [ 0    w(3) -w(2) w(1); 
             -w(3) 0     w(1) w(2); 
              w(2) -w(1) 0    w(3); 
             -w(1) -w(2) -w(3) 0 ]; 
end 
  
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 






% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Normalization Function 
%  
% Description:This function is a generic normalizer function. 
function [normalized] = NormalizeV(aVector) 
    normalized = aVector./norm(aVector); 
end 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Convert To Quaternion 
%  
% Description:This function is responsible for converting a axisangle  
% rotation to a quaternion representation. 
function [quat] = convertToQuaternion(angle) 
quat = [angle(1:3).*sin(angle(4)/2); cos(angle(4)/2)]; 
end 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 






% Description:This function is responsible for converting a quaternion 
% vector to its axis angle representation. 
function [angle] = convertToAxisAngle(quat) 
t = wrapToPi(2*acos(quat(4))); 
k = quat(1:3)./sin(t/2); 
angle = [NormalizeV(k);t]; 
end 
%  
% function x=wrapToPi(a) 
% x = a - 2*pi*floor( (a)/(2*pi) );  
% end 
 
% Date: Thu, 20 Feb, 2017 
% Last updated: 15 March, 2017 
% Author: Akshay Prasad 
% Organization: University of Maryland, College Park (MSSE Student) 
%  
% Project: Secure State Estimation for Quadrotors 
% Component: Function - Gc Matrix 
%  
% Description:This function calculates the Gc matrix 
function [ x ] = calculateGc( C ) 
    temp=zeros(3); 
    I_3=eye(3); 
    x=[temp temp temp temp; 
       -C' temp temp temp; 
       temp temp -I_3 temp; 
       temp temp temp I_3; 
       temp I_3 temp temp; 
       zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) zeros(4,3) 
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